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1. Internalization of Externalities
In the welfaze economic literature environmental problems aze traditionally described as negative
externalities (cf. M~ler, 1985; Pearce and Turner, 1990; Tietenberg, 1992). This tradition has
its roots in Pigou's Economics of Welfare (1920). As much a tradition among economists is
Pigou's recommendation to internalize externalities. According to Pigou (1920, p. 192) the state
should correct the market failure by imposing a tax on the production of negative externalities
(e.g. chazging the emission of processing water) and by subsidizing the production of positive
externalities (e.g. purification of processing water). In this way the externality (e.g. the natural
resource used) receives a shadow price which is included in the agents' private cost-benefit
calculations. If the shadow prices are set at the right level, a Pareto optimal exploitation of
nature - that is pollution of the environment and depletion of natural resources according to
the preferences of the economic agents - is supposed to be the result. In current environmental
economics the Pigovian internalization method of taxing and subsidizing has been evolved into
a set of so-called economic instruments, including different types of levies and chazges, subsi-
dies and mazketable pollution rights (Bohm and Russel, 1985; Opschoor and Vos, 1989).
Internalization methods aze in the centre of the debate concerning the design and implementation
of environmental policies. Traditionally, regulatory instruments such as standazds regarding
emissions and discharges, product and process requirements, both executed by way of licensing
and monitoring, have been used as the basic means of environmental policy in most countries.
Polluters' compliance is mandatory and often sanctions for noncompliance exist. The remaining
pollution is frequently taken care of by public authorities. The tradition of applying this
'command and control philosophy' has historical roots in the urban sewerage and other public
hygiene programs of the 19th century.
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Economists consider the internalization of externalities by way of direct regulations inadequate
regazding the cost-effectiveness of environmental policies. In short, uniform prohibitions and
prescriptions pass over the great diversity of ecological circumstances at local level. Further,
abating emissions by direct regulations do not make much appeal to the knowledge and creativi-
ty of individual economic agents. Finally, economic agents and whole sectors face the paralizing
effects of the straitjacket of direct regulations. If, however, an attempt is made to tailor the
prohibitions and prescriptions to the local ecological conditions, as well as to the diverse
technical and economical features of individual economic agents, the costs of gathering the
necessary information and enforcing the regulations will be prohibitive. Achieving exogenous
environmental standazds in the most flexibel way requires the implementation of incentives to
less polluting behavior which mobilize the knowledge of local ecological conditions and
stimulate technological development for environmental improvements (cf. Baumol and Oates,
1988, pp. 159-176). This is in a nutshell why economists urge for using more often economic
instruments as a necessazy condition to improve the cost-effectiveness of current environmental
policies.
In this paper it is questioned whether internalization is the central issue. The debate on cost-
effective internalization methods passes over the conflicting interests which aze at the heart of
each environmental problem. Moreover, the debate suggests that only some technical obstacles
have to be removed to find the most adequate way of internalization for each case of
externalities. But in our view the problem of choosing and developing cost-effective
internalization methods is not the main obstacle on the road to a sustainable society. This
assertion is elaborated in Section 2 which deals with the character of the externality concept in
economic theory. In Sections 3 and 4 the azgument is illustrated with two cases concerning
acidification: transboundary SOZ emissions and NOX emissions by motor cars. Section 5 contains
a conclusion.
2. Externalities and Property Rights
Externalities are at the core of mainstream environmental economics. The term externalities is
today commonly used as an abbreviation of the concept once referred to as external economies
and external diseconomies or, in Pigou's pazlance, 'uncompensated services and disservices'.
Pollution of water, air and soil, noise, stench and the destruction of the landscape aze described
as negative externalities or negative external effects. Since Pigou's Economics of Welfare
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(1920), a nagative externality has been defined as "an incidental and unintended by-product of
some legitimate form of activity" (Mishan, 1981, p. 392). The loss experienced by the victim
is not regarded as a cost-item by the originator of the externality.
On closer consideration the distinction based on the intention of the agents between externalities
and private goods and services is not convincing as an analytical instrument to understand
environmental problems. If A's paper mill pollutes the river and B gets ill from drinking the
polluted water, conventional theory speaks of a negative externality. But if A buys and eats the
only left bread at the baker's by which B suffers from hunger, no externality is thought to be
created. The conventional approach (which is represented in Mishan's definition of externalities)
fails to explain why it is any more or less intentional when A eats and B gets hungry than when
A produces effluents and B gets sick.
Externalities points at interdependencies between economic agents which in conventional
economic theory are seen as 'incidental', that is, as rare and special events. But as the previous
examples indicate, there are many situations in which the actions of A affect the well-being of
B. As Samuels and Schmid state, human interdependences are ubiquitous (Samuels and Schmid,
1981; Schmid, 1987). These interdependences are the basis of both cooperation and conflict.
If two persons are needed to built a house, A and B could decide to cooperate. The advantage
of the cooperation, however, does not mean that joint effort will be forthcoming. Often a
dispute over the distribution of the fruits of joint effort keeps the the house from built at all.
People unavoidably affect each other in situations of scarcity. Scarcity means conflict over the
control of resources. How this conflict is resolved depends on the property rights structure in
society. Property rights describe the relationship of one person to another with respect to a
resource or any line of action. As Schmid (1987, p. 5) puts it: "Rights are the instrumentality
by which society controls and orders human interdependence and resolves the question of who
gets what". The rights structure could be called the second dimension of scarcity. It is one thing
to give up something to obtain a scarce good or service. But this exchange is conditioned by
social choices of who has the (recognized) rights that become inputs and costs to the production
of a product and who has enough rights to sell that generate the income to buy scarce goods and
services. In this sense, "scarcity is partly a matter of physical constraints ..... but it is also a
matter of fundamental public choice" (Schmid, 1987, p. 8).
In conventional economic theory externalities are seen as a market failure, because market
prices fail to reflect the relative scarcity of the resources available. To put it in another way,
preferences concerning externalities cannot be revealed at the market. Traditionally,
3
internalization of externalities is recommanded, preferably by economic instruments such as
taxes and transferable permits. In this way an externality becomes priced in the sense that "it
becomes indistinguishable from any other 'good' or 'bad' handled by the market sector. T'he
externality then disappears from the economic scene" (Mishan, 1981, p. 407). In short, it is
suggested that internalization eliminates the externalities concerned.
However, we do not share the common view that internalization procedures eliminate external-
ities. If interests conflict one or more of the interests are inevitably external and must go unmet.
Property rights determine which interests count, that is, whether A is allowed to affect B or vice
versa. Internalization means a shift in the rights structure. As formerly the paper mill was
allowed to pollute the river, it has now to pay for effluent discharge (Pigovian tax), to buy an
amount of discharge rights (transferable permit) or to install equipment which purifies the
effluents to a certain degree before discharging them (prescription). Internalization reduces the
opportunity set of the paper mill, but expand the opportunity set of people living down stream.
The interdependence between the paper mill and down stream inhabitants is not diminished,
disappeared or eliminated, as little as the conflict of interests. The change in the distribution of
property rights does not imply that the externality is made internal. The change in rule only
shifted the externality from one party to the other, that is, the interest of tapping drinking water
from the river has been given more weight than the interest of discharging effluents into the
river.
Since Coase's influential article (1960) interest grew in the relationship between externalities
and property rights. From the literature one gets the impression that only property rights have
to be established (and, of course, enforced in the legal system) to leave the internalization of
externalities to the market. An efficient resource allocation would be quite independend of who
was given the property rights - either the generator or the victim. All that is said to matter is
that the parties involved will easy bargain on the compensation to be given to the rights owner
with the aim to reduce the externalities once the rights have been allocated.' It should be
pointed out that this result hinges upon two very critical assumptions: (1) internalization requires
no transaction costs, that is, the gathering of the information needed, the bargaining on an
agreement and the enforcement of the agreement are without costs; (2) there are no wealth
effects of alternative rights structures. But as Bromley (1991, p. 63) makes clear, "in a world
without transaction costs there could be no externalities". All physical interactions which would
' If the rights owner refuses any kind of compensation the externality is also internalized.
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unintendedly but unwantedly arise would have costlessly bargained away in the absence of
transaction costs. This does not mean that all physical interdependences are disappeared, but that
the conventional notion of an externality could not exist (Bromley, 1991, p. 64).
In a world with transaction costs environmental damage is highly determined by the initial
property rights assignment. Mobilizing the population living down stream to make a bid to
tempt an upstream paper mill to reduce its legitimate eft]uent discharges will result in a more
polluted river than would be the case if the paper mill has to make a bid to the inhabitants down
stream having the legitimate right on a clean river. Although clearly defined property rights
helps to solve environmental problems, the most relevant issue is who has the rights and thus
who has the effective protection of the state to do as he wish (Bromley, 1991, p. 35). State
protection is, however, not always needed. As Schmid (1987, p. 97) points out, even without
an explicit right those interested in the status quo could be well protected by high transaction
costs.
In conventional theary, internalization of externalities is expected to improve economic
efficiency. However, the existing distribution ofproperty rights determines the concrete contents
of the e~ciency improvement. As long as the paper mill is legitimately entitled to discharge
effluents, a reduction or purification of the effluents without adequate compensation is not
efficient. Because the existing rights structure defines what is a cost and who shall bear
unwanted costs, an efficient outcome of the economic process is uniquely related to a specific
rights structure. As Bromley (1991, p. 67) puts it, for every structure of resource endowments
- and institutions define and specify resource endowments - there is a Pareto-eff cient
outcome. Change the institutional environment and there will be a new e~cient solution."
To summerize, property rights determine which effects of A's actions on B are costs to A and
which are external to A, that is, which can be ignored. Internalization of externalities is
irrelevant in the sense that externalities cannot be eliminated, but can at best be shifted or
transformed by a change of the rights structure. Consequently, social decisions on the rights
structure directs externalities and determines whose interests count.
3. Transboundary S02 Emissions
The irrelevance of internalizing externalities can be illustrated with the case of acidification in
Europe. Two sources of acidification will be briefly discussed: the emissions of SOZ (this
section) and the motor car emissions of NOx (next section).
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Most ofthe SOZ emissions originate from large incinerators such as refineries and electric power
plants. Today it is commonly known that SOZ emissions aze transported and dispersed over great
distances, especially since at the end of the sixties and the beginning of the seventies tall
chimneys have been erected to abate the smog in industrial areas. Hence, SOZ emissions are an
excellent example of transboundary air pollution. As a consequence, the acidification due to SOZ
emissions can only be abated in an international context, that is, by way of international
negotiations. Prior to being an issue on the international agenda the recognition is required that
the environmental damage, that is in this case acidification, is caused by transboundary
emissions.
Already a century ago Smith (1872) indicated that air pollution has a transboundary chazacter.
He proved that considerable economic losses were the result of it. However, it took 100 yeazs
before international action was taken. This long delay is strongly connected to high transaction
costs when international environmental problems aze at issue. International action only makes
sense if the damage in the victim country exceeds the transaction costs. This was appearently
the case in 1972, at the United Nations Conference of 1972 in Stockholm. At this conference
Sweden azgued that the ecological deterioration of the fresh water lakes and streams in
Scandinavia was mainly caused by transboundazy SOZ emissions originating from industrial
azeas in other European countries. In pazticulaz steel mills and power plants were seen as
significant emitters. Sweden was of the opinion that the joint production of air pollution and
steel should be reorganized in such a way that air pollution brought to their country should
come to an end. Other European countries did not pay for the ecological damage in
Scandinavia.
Clearly, until 1972 no explicit property rights were established concerning transboundazy
emissions. Actually, European producers had simply been taken the opportunity to emit SOZ on
a large scale, due to the circumstance of high costs for the victim to relate the ecological
damage to individual emitters, to bazgain with all the emitters involved and, in the event of a
satisficing bargaining result, to enforce the agreement. The existence of high transaction costs
protected the implicit pollution rights of SOZ emitters. European countries such as England, the
Federal Republic of Germany, Poland and the German Democratic Republic refused to
recognize the Swedish charges and arguments, because of their interests in the status quo. These
countries insisted that the relationship between their SOZ emissions and the ecological damage
in Sweden was never proved.
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At the Stockholm Conference an agreement could not be realized due to the objections of the
emitting countries. They were not willing to change the rights structure, that is to redistribute
the rights on the Scandinavian air in favor of Sweden. The participants of the Conference could
only agree upon starting an international research concerning the relationship between SOZ
emissions in Europe and the reported ecological damage in Scandinavia. This research was done
by the Economic Commission for Europe of the United Nations. After many years of research
it could be proved that, indeed, SOZ emissions are transported and dispersed over great
distances. As a result of the dominant southern and western winds 80-909'0 of the acidifying
deposition in Scandinavia originates from other European countries. The continous increase of
industrial production after 1950 combined with the construction oftall chimneys in the European
industrial areas were the main reasons for the acidification in Scandinavia.
The Scandinavian lakes could only be rescued by a significant reduction of the SOZ emissions
in other European countries. It took a long period and many laborious negotiations before an
agreement on reductions could be realized. At a conference in Geneva in 1983 the Scandinavian
countries proposed to reduce all emissions by 30q compared with the emission levels of 1980.
However, some countries such as West- Germany and the Netherlands had already considerably
reduced their emissions before 1980. They fiercely objected against this redistribution of
property rights because it would imply a reward for the obstinate attitude of several countries,
such as England and East-Germany.
It took a long time before all countries were convinced that emission reductions were inevitably.
Agreement on the main goal does not imply, however, agreement on the way emission
reductions must be realized. At the IIASA Institute in Vienna a model has been developed which
explores the possibilities of emission reductions in whole Europe (Alcamo, Shaw and Hordijk,
1991). Using this model it is possible to determine which emission reductions are the most cost-
effective given the desired reduction of acidifying depositions. This approach could be
interpreted as an attempt to internalize the negative externalities (acidification) of especially
steel, oil derivatives and electricity production processes in the most e~cient way, implying the
generation of the largest possible aggregate reduction of acidifying depositions for the lowest
possible aggregate cost. However, this model has never been used in the negotiations due to the
dominant ditributional consequences of this internalization. Instead, in 1985 it has been decided
in Helsinki to reduce all SOZ emissions by 303'0. This outcome obligates some countries to
realize small emission reductions at high costs, while the same amount of money would produce
large emission reductions elswhere in Europe.
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To summerize, no property rights were formally established and assigned concerning the use
of air as a sink for SOZ emissions until the Helsinki agreement of 1985. As a matter of fact,
extensive pollution rights were informally bequeathed to emitters of SOZ due to the high
transaction costs of initiatives to reduce the emissions. This informal rights structure created the
externality of acidification. In international negotiations no attempts were made to internalize
this externality in either the Pigovian or the Coasean tradition. Instead, the rights structure was
changed and formalized simply to redistribute the unwanted costs of economic activities.
4. The Abatement of NO~ Emissions by Motor Cars in the European Community
Economists adhering the conventional internalization approach may object that the appearently
irrelevance of internalization efforts in international negotiations on SOZ emission reductions is
the natural consequence of the absence of a generally recognized and accepted authority able
to implement the internalization of externalities. Formal property rights must be established
prior to negotiations on emission reductions. Moreover, explicit property rights are
indispensable if economic intruments such as regulatory taxes or transferable pollution permits
are used as an internalization method.
To investigate whether the existence of a rule making authority weakens the argument of the
irrelevance of internalization efforts, the reduction of NOx emissions by motor cars is analyzed
in the following paragraphs. Like the SOz emissions, NOX emissions substantially contribute to
the acidification beyond the own country borders. Among the most important emitters are power
plants, oil refineries and motor cars. Motor cars are in a special position as they are mobile.
They cross the borders of countries. Because both sources and emissions cross borders attempts
to reduce the emissions only have sense in an international context. But unlike the attempts to
reduce SOZ emissions in international negotiations, NOx emission reductions could be agreed
upon within the institutional context of the European Community (EC). The EC has much more
supranational features - without being a fullfledged supranational organization - than the
international consultation rounds on SOz emission reductions.
In the EC the discussion about the abatement of NOx emissions by motor cars started in the
beginning of the eighties after it became clear that the dying off of forests in the Federal
Republic of Germany was caused by 'acid rain'. The discussion was focused on which measures
could be taken. The UK preferred the so-called lean-mixture engine in which fuel is burnt in
a special way, resulting in less heat of combustion. The relatively low combustian temperature
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results in lower emissions of COZ and NOx. With this type of engine NOX emissions could be
reduced by 70l0 . At that moment, however, the lean-mixture engine was in an experimental
phase. The British preference for the introduction of this engine is strongly related to the
comparative advantage British industries had in this field of research and developmentz.
The Federal Republic of Germany preferred the installation of catalysers. The fast developing
process of deterioration and dying off of the forests shocked a large part of the German
population. Therefore, the abatement of 'acid rain' was given a high profile in Germany. A
catalyser achieves a higher reduction of NOx emissions, viz. 90~0, than a lean-mixture engine
does. However, the addition of a catalyser to car motors would increase petrol consumption by
10 to 209~. However, the consequence of an increase of CO2 emissions had no impact on the
discussion, because in the beginning of the eighties the greenhouse effect hardly had public
attention unlike recent years. The vitality of the forests in the United Kingdom was much better
than elsewhere in Europe due to the dominance of calcareous soils in large parts of the UK.
Calcareous soils are not so vulnerable for acidification as other types of soil. Moreover, the UK
takes advantage of a favorable geographical location implying that the UK is a net exporter of
acidifying substances due to the dominant western winds blowing British emissions to the
continent.
A second reason for the German preference for catalysers is related to the competitive position
of the national car industries in different European countries. The West-German car industry
produces more cars with heavy engines than the British, French and Italian industries do. A
catalyser only functions adequately if it is installed together with hightech equipment. Generally
speaking, German industries took the lead in the development of this technology. Therefore,
German car industry reckoned with an improvement of its competitiveness if the catalyser
technology could be introduced. The industries involved pressed the German government doing
the utmost in the EC negotiations on the reduction of motor car emissions to favor the
introduction of the catalyser in the EC.
The competetitiveness of the national car industries varies in Europe. The position of the West-
German car industry was considered to be strong, while the UK car industry was evaluated as
being weak because of the outdated production processes. 1fie Italian and the French car indus-
tries took up a middle position. The Japanese car industry had been able to obtain a strong
2 Boehmer-Christiansen (1992) elaborates on the comparative advantage of both the United
Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany concerning emission reduction techniques for motor
cars.
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position in Europe. Against this background the British, French and Italian car industries feared
that a EC requirement to add on a catalyser would raise the price of their small cars relatively
more than the price of the bigger West-German cars. In addition, they were afraid that the
German car industry, having a comparative advantage regarding this new technology, would
considerably improve their competitive position. A substantial decrease of returns on the small
cars market followed by large-scale unemployment was feared. Such a scenario easely arouse
the memories of the drastic reorganizations of the European steel sector as well as the textile
industry, which used to be important branches of industry, particularly in France and the United
Kingdom. For these countries the effects on the employment were a key issue during the EC
negotiations on the reduction of motor car emissions.
Regarding the complications previously mentioned it is not surprising that the negotiations on
the reduction of motor car emissions took many years. The crucial issue appeared to be the level
of the standards. Weak standards would undoubtly favor the introduction of the lean-mixture
engine, while strict standards would clear the way for the add on technology of the catalyser.
A further complication was that the negotiation process could easily be delayed due to the
practice of taking unanimous decisions in the Council of Ministers. If a single EC member state
feared unfavorable (economic) consequences, an agreement on the level of the emission
standards was blocked by a veto. During the negotiation process this unanimity 'rule' was
changed (in 1988) into (qualified) majority voting, which considerably hampers the delaying
tactics. Finally, in the face of the next elections for the European Parliament in June 1989
politicians feared a bad image if no decision would be taken concerning the level of the
emission standards. The decision making proeess suddenly gained momentum in the first six
months of 1989. Ultimately strict standards were accepted. Once this decision was made, the
choice in favor of the catalyser was also made. As a result the research and development on the
lean-mixture engine was given a low profile3.
In our view the decision making process on the abatement of NOX emissions by motor cars in
the EC cannot be interpreted in terms of an internalization effort of negative externalities. The
continuous tug-of-war only demonstrates the interdependence of the agents involved, in this case
because their interests conflict in a complicated way. In this context the position of Germany
was a special one. On the one hand, Germany played the role of the victim because it
3 Elswhere we analyzed this decision making process in more detail (Dietz, Van der Straaten and
Van der Velde, 1991).
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considerably suffered from the effects of acid rain. On the other hand, while pushing a
particular method for emission reduction it favored the national industrial interests. Ultimately,
a change in the 'rules of the game', that is the possibility of majority voting, as well as the
electoral pressure of the European citizens concerning environmental issues, did much to help
forcing a breakthrough and changing the rights structure.
5. Conclusion
This paper should not be interpreted as an argument against the calculation of specific efficiency
or cost-effectiveness when objectives are made explicit. Only an argument is given against
presumptive choices among conflicting interests contained in the theory expecting efficiency
improvements by internalization. Whenever interests conflict effciency cannot be improved
without making a value judgement weighting the interests of one party over another.
Externalities are an expression of human interdepences. They are not rare and it does not matter
whether they are intentional or not. They cannot be eliminated, but only transformed or shifted.
Put it in another way, 'external effects on B of A's acts can at best be reduced by increasing
the external effects on A of B's acts" (Schmid, 1987, p. 10).
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